

Enhanced Surveillance and Control Measures in Public Hospitals for "Severe Respiratory Disease associated with a Novel Infectious Agent"

Prepared by Chief Infection Control Officer (CICO)
Office

16 January 2020



HA Preparedness Plan for Infectious Disease Pandemic

HA's response to infectious disease pandemic generally follows the HK Government response system. A 3-tier system is differentiated according to the risk of the infectious disease causing serious health impact in HK.



Coordinated by Food and Health Bureau (FHB) and steer Government response

Steering Committee chaired by Secretary for Food and Health (SFH)

Steering Committee chaired by the Chief Executive with FHB

HA will activate the same response levels according to response levels activated by the Government.





Serious (1) level

Convene Ad hoc CCIDER

Serious (2) level or Emergency level


Convene Ad hoc CCIDER

HA Central Command Committee (CCC) chaired by CE of HA

Emergency Executive Committee (EEC) delegated by HA Board.

Risk Assessment

- HK Government and HA's preparedness plans are based on <u>risk</u> assessments rather than scenarios.
- Risk assessment can help to initiate the right response actions at the right time.
- Areas of concern in the risk assessment as follow:



Response Levels

Alert

- Risk of novel infectious disease causing serious health impact in HK is low.
- Level intended to prevent importation of disease

Serious


- Risk of novel infectious disease causing serious health impact in HK is moderate.
- Will be activated and stood-down by SFH.
- Level intended to limit transmission

Emergency


- Risk of novel infectious disease causing serious health impact in HK is high and imminent.
- Serious infections may be widespread
- Will be activated and stood-down by CE of HK Government.



Governance




Command Structure



Risk assessment in Hong Kong


- Immediate health impact on local population is moderate.
 - Frequent traffic (flight and high-speed rail) between Wuhan and Hong Kong
 - Imported case from Wuhan is likely
- 4 Jan 2020
 - Government launched the Preparedness and Response Plan for Novel Infectious Disease of Public Health Significance, and activated Serious Response Level.
 - HA activated Serious Response Level (S2).




Management of Suspected / Confirmed Cases

Bundle Approach

- Early isolation: airborne infection isolation (AII) for suspect cases.
 Confirmed case should be centrally isolated and managed at HA Infectious Disease Centre (IDC)
- 2. Early notification: electronic platform(s) for surveillance and timely reporting i.e. NDORS / eNID
- 3. Early detection: Laboratory testing at HA laboratories and PHLSB of DH with turnaround time (TAT) < 24 hours



AED Triage – FTOCC Risk Assessment





Patient Isolation

Nurse in Airborne Infection Isolation Room (AIIR)
 (i.e. with negative pressure and at least 12
 ACH) en- suite with toilet facility, in an isolation
 ward setting)

Fluid resistant gown

Face shield / goggles

N95 respirator

/ eve visors

Disposable gloves

2. Implement Airborne, Droplet and Contact Precautions in addition to Standard Precautions

3. PPE: N95 respirator, goggles / face shield, gown, gloves, and cap (optional) for aerosol-generating procedures and routine patient care











Case Referral

 Cases fulfilled the reporting criteria should be isolated at local hospitals.

- Cases fulfilled the reporting criteria screened at Boundary Control Points will be admitted to catchment hospitals' isolation wards under the prevailing port health referral mechanism.
- All confirmed cases with novel coronavirus will be referred to HA IDC for case management.

Referral of Infectious Diseases from Boundary Control Points to HA Hospitals

Version: 22.10.2019

Compulsory Referral of Infectious Diseases from BCPs to HA Hospitals

(1) For suspected Novel Influenza A (including Avian Influenza). Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS), Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS), Cholera cases

Boundary Control Point (BCP) 出入境管制站	Referring Hospital 轉介醫院管理局醫院	Cluster Coordinator & Contact Number(s) 聯絡人及聯絡電話		
HK Macau Ferry Terminal (港澳碼頭)	Queen Mary Hospital 瑪麗醫院 Address: 102 Pokfulam Road, Hong Kong	A&E in charge Tel: 2255 3709 (Back up: A&E nursing staff, Tel: 2255 3007)		
China HK Ferry Terminal (中港晤 第) Ocean Terminal (海運馬第) Hung Hom Railway Terminal BCP (紅磡管制站) West Kowloon Station (西九龍高鐵站)	Queen Elizabeth Hospital 伊利沙伯馨院 Address: 30 Gascoigne Road, Kowloon	If aged below 18 - Paed A9 MO vi operator, Tel: 3506 8887 If aged 18 or above - · Adult isolation ward in-charge Tel: 3506 5124 · Adult ICU on call via operator, Tel 3506 8887		
Kai Tak Cruise Terminal (政德郵輪碼頭)	United Christian Hospital 基督教聯合醫院 Address: 130 Hip Wo Street, Kwun Tong, Kowloon	A&E Nursing staff in charge Tel: 3949 4125 (Back up: Dr. Kitty Fung, Tel: 521 6456)		
Lo Wh BCP (維洲管制党) Lok Ma Chau Spurline BCP (落馬洲支線管制党) Lok Ma Chau BCP (茨馬洲管制党) Sha Tau Kok BCP (沙明角管制党) Man Kam To BCP (文錦渡管制党) Heung Yuen Wai BCP (青潤顯管制 建)	North District Hospital 北區醫院 Address: 9 Po Kin Road, Sheung Shui, New Territories	AED Nurse in charge Tel: 2683 7230		
Shenzhen Bay Port BCP (深圳灣管制站) Tuen Mum Terminal (屯門客運碼 頭) Shek Kong Stabling Sidings (石崗列車停放處)	Tuen Mun Hospital 电四唇统 Address: 23 Tsing Chung Koon Road, Tuen Mun, New Territories	Infection Control Unit Tel: Operator 2468 5111, Extension 9		
Hong Kong International Airport (香港國際機場) Hong Kong - Zhuhai - Macao Bridge Hong Kong Port BCP (港珠澳大橋香港口岸管制站)	Princess Margaret Hospital Backets: 2-10 Princess Margaret Hospital Road, Lai Chi Kok, Kowloon	Infectious Disease Centre If aged below 18 – Tel: 2990 2950 If aged 18 or above – Tel: 2990 3024		


Case Reporting Criteria

Severe Respiratory Disease associated with a Novel Infectious Agent (嚴重新型傳染性病原體呼吸系統病)

Clinical criteria		Epidemiological criteria
 Patient presented with fever and acute respiratory illness, OR With pneumonia 	AND	Travel history to Wuhan (武漢市) within 14 days before onset of symptoms (irrespective of any exposure to wet market of seafood market)

Notification

- With effect from 8 January 2020, "Severe Respiratory Disease associated with a Novel Infectious Agent" is a statutorily notifiable disease under the Prevention and Control of Disease Ordinance (Cap 599).
- Clinicians should report any suspected case to CHP and HAHO via NDORS/eNID.
- RCS and SMS messages to alert relevant stakeholders
- For cases admitted to ICU or died, please call MCO of CHP at 71163300-9179 immediately.





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Laboratory Investigation

Respiratory specimen

Upper respiratory tract

 Nasopharyngeal Flocked Swabs (NPFS), or Nasopharyngeal Aspirate (NPA) [in Viral Transport Medium (TM)]

Local lab

- To rule out other respiratory pathogens by FilmArray[®]
- TAT: 24 hours

 SHS for additional specimen transportation during Saturdays, Sundays, and Public Holidays is included under winter surge programmes.

Respiratory specimen

Lower respiratory tract (always preferred)

- Sputum
- Tracheal Aspirate (TA) (if intubated)
- Bronchoalveolar Lavage (BAL) (if bronchoscopy) Upper respiratory tract
- Nasopharyngeal Flocked Swabs (NPFS), or Nasopharyngeal Aspirate (NPA) [in Viral Transport Medium (TM)]

One lower respiratory tract specimen (if any) <u>PLUS</u> One upper respiratory tract specimen

Additional specimens to PHLSB

 Baseline clotted blood 5ml (2ml for paediatric patients)

PHLSB

- Cut-off time of respiratory specimen arrival for same day results:
 - Weekdays 12:00 noon
 - Saturdays/Sundays/Public holidays
 10:00 am
- Address:
 - Weekdays: G/F, PHLC
 - Saturdays/Sundays/Public holidays: 8th Floor, PHLC

Enhanced Laboratory Surveillance for Novel Coronavirus (nCoV) related to pneumonia cases in Wuhan (Effective from 13 Jan 2020)

Any pneumonia case:

- with unknown causes (not responding to treatment in 3 days); or
- requiring ICU care; or
- occurring in clusters; or
- who is a healthcare worker

irrespective of their travel history.

 Any case scenario apart from the above inclusion criteria should be assessed by hospital Infection Control Officer or Infectious Disease Physician for the testing of novel coronavirus.

(11) 機能管理 HOSPITA CM(IEC), HAHO : CCEs & HCEs, All medical staff HA752/10/38/70 : Directors' Meeting, : 2300 6456 COC(Med), COC(Paed), COC(Path). 2300 7701 COC(A&E), COC(ICU), COC(FM), 13 January 2020 Enhanced Laboratory Surveillance for Novel Coronavirus (nCoV) related to pneumonia cases in Wulhan For the purpose of early identification of severe community-acquired pneumonia associated with emerging infections, the Centre for Health Protection (CHP) and HA Central Committee on Infectious Diseases and Emergency Response (CCIDER) recommended the enhanced laboratory surveillance, such as Avian Influenza (AI) and Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS) since 2012 (Annexes I & II). In view of the latest situation of the cluster of pneumonia cases caused by nove coronavirus (nCoV) in Wuhan (武漢市) and the start of Spring Festival travel, the CHP and the HA CCIDER recommend to extend the enhanced laboratory surveillance to nCoV-associated pneumonia cases. · with unknown causes (not responding to treatment in 3 days); or · requiring ICU care: or · occurring in clusters; or · who is a healthcare worker irrespective of their travel history Any case scenario apart from the above inclusion criteria should be assessed by hospital Infection Control Officer or Infectious Disease Physician for the testing of 1) Specimen should be taken for cases fulfilling the above inclusion criteria and sent to PHLC for RT-PCR for novel coronavirus. 2) Specify "Testing for novel coronavirus" on the laboratory request form. 3) Cases with positive results of novel coronavirus should be isolated in airborn

Actions required:

- Specimen should be taken for cases fulfilling the above inclusion criteria and sent to PHLC for RT-PCR for novel coronavirus.
- 2. Specify "Testing for novel coronavirus" on the laboratory request form.
- Cases with positive results of novel coronavirus should be isolated in airborne infection isolation room (AIIR) and reported to NDORS immediately.

Specimen Transport

- All specimens are required to sent via hospital courier services to HA laboratories, PHLSB and QMH laboratories to suit the local lab workflow.
- Clusters are advised to explore the available couriers services to support the delivery of the specimens. In case of any difficulties encountered, clusters could contact networked clusters or HO BSSD in accordance with the Response Plan of Business Support Services in Handling Major Incidents for coordination of cross-cluster support for transporting specimens.
 - First priority: hospital courier service
 - Second priority: contract out service is acceptable

Clinical Management

- General Clinical Management
 - Monitor vital signs and organ functions, and recognize complication(s) early
 - Liaise with ICU early for intensive care if anticipate clinical deterioration
 - Provide supportive treatments
 - Oxygen
 - IV fluid
 - Inotropic support +/-steroid* (septic shock)
 - Mechanical ventilation +/-ECMO (respiratory failure)
 - Renal dialysis (renal failure)
- Potential specific anti-viral agents with available stocks in HA pharmacy
 - Kaletra
 - Interferons (interferon- β , interferon- γ)
 - Ribavirin

Release from Isolation

Revised principle to be considered for releasing SUSPECTED case from isolation (NOT applicable to probable case)

For patient with known etiology which can explain the clinical presentation AND has clinical improvement AND negative RT-PCR for SARS CoV related virus AND consensus obtained from MCO of CHP

OR

For patient without known etiology but has clinical improvement AND fever subsided for 24 hours AND chest X-ray is clear/improving AND negative RT-PCR for SARS CoV related virus AND consensus obtained from MCO CHP

Patient Care Equipment

- Handle used/soiled patient-care equipment carefully to prevent skin and mucous membrane exposures, contamination of clothing, and transfer of microorganisms to other patients and environment
- Designate non-critical patient care equipment to the patients. If sharing is unavoidable, clean and disinfect with sodium hypochlorite solution 1,000 ppm after each patient use
- Respiratory therapy equipment require high-level disinfection. Central reprocessing is preferred based on local hospital policy. Well-packed contaminated items before transfer to prevent environmental contamination

Environmental Control

- Decontaminate the environment regularly and immediately when becomes visibly soiled
- Decontaminate patient environment, especially hightouch areas, at least once daily in general clinical areas
- Clean and disinfect with sodium hypochlorite solution 1,000 ppm twice daily in high risk areas with suspected and confirmed patients
- 4. Perform terminal disinfection upon each patient discharge
- 5. Strengthen cleaning schedule as advised by HICT

Linen Handling

- All linen should be classified as infected linen. Linen bag should be secured with "infected linen" tag with information of the origin.
- 2. Avoid sorting linens in patient-care areas.
- Place linen into water soluble bag, then a laundry bag with minimal manipulation or agitation to avoid contamination of air, surfaces and persons.



Waste Management

 All wastes from suspected or confirmed patients are classified as clinical waste



 Use bedpan washer to clean and thermal disinfect the urinals and bedpans

Follow HA Operation Circular No. 4/2015
 Implementation of Clinical Waste
 Management Plan (CWMP) for proper
 handling and disposal of clinical wastes

Cleaning of Spills of Blood and Body Fluids

- Clean the visible soils with disposable absorbent material and discard it into the appropriate waste bag
- 2. Mop the area with a cloth or paper towels wetted with sodium hypochlorite solution 10,000 ppm, leave for 10 minutes
- 3. Then rinse with water and allow the area to air dry
- 4. 70% alcohol can be used in metal surface if household bleach is contraindicated

Handling of Dead Body

- Handling and disposal of dead body according to Cat. 2
- 2. Use YELLOW label
- 3. Follow the additional precautions as recommended in "Precautions for Handling and Disposal of Dead Bodies, 10th edition." https://www.chp.gov.hk/files/pdf/grp-guideline-hp-ic-precautions_for_handling_and_disposal_of_dead_bodies_en.pdf

		Danger of	Infection	小心傳染	Category 類別				
9	In handling dead bodies, Standard Precautions are required. 處理屍體時需要採取標準預防措施。 In addition, the following precautions are also required: 此外,下列附加的預防措施亦必須採納:								
	Bagging 入屍袋	Viewing in funeral parlour 殯儀館內瞻仰遺容	Embalming 防腐處理	Hygienic preparation in funeral parlour 殯儀館內裝身及化妝					
	Must 必須	Allowed 可以	Not allowed 不可以	•	gloves, apron and surgical mask 即棄的手套、圍裙和外科口罩				

Patient Transport

- Limit patient transport to essential purpose only
- 2. Wear appropriate PPE when handling patients
- 3. Provide surgical mask to patients during transportation if not contraindicated
- Inform the receiving ward/ parties before patient transport to facilitate appropriate arrangement.
- Inform the administration to prepare the designated route for transport. The involved area should be disinfected afterwards.
- 6. Disinfect transport vehicles after use

Enhanced Measures under S2

Enhanced Measures under S2

- Universal masking at all clinical areas, including waiting halls of AEDs, OPDs and pharmacy offices
 - Patients at medical wards are encouraged to put on surgical masks as far as possible.
 - Hospitals will provide surgical masks to patients and visitors if necessary.
- ILI Segregation Areas at AEDs
- All Aerosol-generating procedures (AGPs) should be conducted under airborne precautions.



Influenza-Like Illness (ILI) Segregation Area

Please wear surgical mask
when entering ILI Segregation Area.
進入流感隔離區時,



Regregation Area. 充感隔離區時, 佩戴外科手術口罩。

Aerosol-generating Procedures (AGPs)

AGP

Non-invasive ventilation (NIV)

Risk assessment

Logistic flowchart for the initiation of NIV in AED

Logistic flowchart for the initiation of NIV in HA hospitals


AGP other than NIV

- 1. Endotracheal intubation
- 2. Cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR)
- 3. Bronchoscopy
- 4. Open suctioning of respiratory tract (including tracheostomy care)
- 5. Autopsy
- 6. High-frequency oscillatory ventilation
- 7. Nebulizer therapy
- 8. Sputum induction

Aerosol-generating Procedures (AGPs)

- All AGPs should be conducted under airborne precautions.
- In high risk patient areas, place patient in a negative pressure airborne infection isolation room (AIIR) before performing AGPs.
- In other patient areas, place patient in a well-ventilated area (e.g. at least minimum overall 6 air changes per hour (ACH) or use portable HEPA filter e.g. IQ Air if indicated) before performing AGPs.


Logistic flowchart for the initiation of NIV in Accident and Emergency Department (AED) [Reference from Communication kit for MERS]



- a: Suspected transmissible respiratory diseases: fever with features suggestive of respiratory tract infections (e.g. sneezing, purulent sputum etc)
 - +/- radiological features of pneumonia
- b: FTOCC=Fever, Travel, Occupation, Cluster and Contact
- c: Disease requiring airborne precautions: such as avian flu, SARS or MERS-CoV, PTB, emerging respiratory viruses

Logistic Flowchart for the Initiation of Non-invasive Ventilation (NIV) in HA hospitals

[Reference from HA Infection Control Plan (MERS) Version 3.1 (Oct 2018)]



Supplementary Notes for NIV

[Reference from Communication kit for MERS]

- All patients who have fulfilled the reporting criteria for novel influenza, MERS-CoV and SARS should have been isolated promptly in AIIR already;
- The "FTOCC" screening criteria applied in the flowchart above refers to cases with "Fever" and one or more of "T: travel to an affected areas during the incubation period"/"O":occupational related/"C":contact of a suspected/confirmed case/"C":cluster of cases detected.
- "Relevant" laboratory investigations refer to tests ordered after clinical and epidemiological assessments
- The possibility of having insufficient AIIR if there is a large number of such patients (e.g. during epidemics and major outbreaks of novel infections) exists
- Manpower issue: increased nursing workload in the isolation areas with NIV cases
- Similar concerns for NIV exist in other aerosol generating procedures
- The flowchart should be read in parallel with the latest Respiratory Consensus Statement on NIV, which can be found in the Hong Kong Respiratory Medicine webpage http://hkts.com2.hk/site/HKTS/upload/editorfile/file/20171117/20171117192543_71234.pdf

NPA, NPS & High Flow Oxygen

- Collection of Nasopharyngeal aspiration (NPA) and nasopharyngeal swab (NPS), and use of high flow oxygen (≥6L/min) are not considered as AGPs in international recommendations, but they are theoretically at risk of dispersal of infectious respiratory droplets, therefore with a more cautious approach, they should be performed in conditions as required for aerosol-generating procedures in high-risk patient areas.
- Other procedures should be assessed on discretion of hospital Infection Control Officers.

Special Consideration

(Consensus in the 4th ad hoc CCIDER meeting on 14 Jan)

- Respiratory care: open suctioning of respiratory tract and sputum induction in convalescent hospitals
 - Taking into consideration of long stay patients who have been undergone FTOCC risk assessment and hospitalized for more than 14 days, staff should wear a surgical mask / N95 respirator for open suctioning or sputum induction in accordance with Standard Precautions and Transmission-based Precautions (if indicated).
 - Hospital Infection Control Teams, with directives given by CCE, would work with different clinical departments for assessment.

Special Consideration

(Consensus in the 4th ad hoc CCIDER meeting on 14 Jan)

- Specimen collection for nasopharyngeal swab (NPS)
 - Risk assessment should be performed prior to NPS collection, and droplet precautions could be applied provided that the following criteria are met:
 - No confirmed nCoV case is reported in Hong Kong; AND
 - Patient does not fulfill FTOCC; AND
 - Patient is not clinically suspected to have airborne infections or emerging infectious diseases, such as Al, MERS-CoV and nCoV.


Special Consideration(Consensus in the 4th ad hoc CCIDER meeting on 14 Jan)

Patient requiring high flow oxygen (≥ 6L/min)

• If an airborne infection isolation room (AIIR) is not available in high risk area such as A&E and GOPC, the patient should be arranged in an area with portable HEPA filter (e.g. IQ Air) and physical barrier.

Enhanced ventilation at A&E & GOPC waiting areas

- Completed the widest opening of the fresh air dampers in the air handling equipment in the waiting areas of AEDs and GOPCs to achieve higher fresh air rate with improved air dilution; and
- Completed wheeling in mobile HEPA units to augment the total air change rates in A&E waiting areas where necessary.



Example: HEPA unit is placed at QEH AED

Enhanced Measures under S2

Isolation facilities utilization

- ~1400 airborne infection isolation (AIIR) beds available
- Daily monitoring of utilization
- Re-designate the use to meet surge admission if necessary

> PPE 90-day stockpile

- Daily monitoring of usage
- A two-tier communication mechanism for the supply of PPE, laundry and linen.

Alcohol-based hand rub (ABHR)

- 3 months additional backup stock
- > ECMO machine utilization
 - ECMO referral network
 - Daily monitoring of usage



				AII be	ds in Isolation	wards			
			under	AII-mode vent		narus			
						admission	under non-AII		AII beds in General
		Designated AII beds	Occupied for AII purpose	% Bed occupied for AII purpose	Vacant beds	Occupied by not AII purpose	mode ventilation	Total	wards
Cluster	Hospital	a	b	b/a	a-c	c-b	d-a	d	e
HKE	PYN	20	13	65%	6	1	. 96	116	3
HKE	RH	5		0%	5			23	C
HKE	TOTAL	25	13	52%	11	. 1	. 114	139	3
HKW	QMH	25		20%				88	0
HKW	TOTAL	25		20%				88	0
KC	KWH	52		2%				58	0
KC	Q⊞	42		33%				149	0
KC	TOTAL	94		16%				207	0
KE	TKO	17		0%				56	0
KE	UCH	36		14%				114	0
KE	TOTAL	53		9%				170	0
KW	СМС	0		N/A	C			20	44
KW	NLT	0		N/A	C			0	8
KW	РМН	84		11%				108	8
KW	YCH	24		25%				24	0
KW	TOTAL	108		14%				152	60
NTE	AHN	20		70%				78	0
NTE	NDH	8		50%			. 28	36	0
NTE	PWH	96		14%				156	12
NTE	TOTAL	124		25%				270	12
NTW	POH	0		N/A	C			0	18
NTW	TMH	56		16%				132	0
NTW	TOTAL	56		16%				132	18
GRAND	TOTAL	485	93	19%	184	208	673	1158	93

PPE	90-Day Contingency Stock
Goggles / Eye Shield	187,200
Face Shield	765,000
Surgical Mask	38,970,010
N95 Respirator	1,377,000
Disposable Isolation Gown	2250,000
Examination Gloves, Disposable (in pair)	26,099,950
Disposable Cap	900,000

Enhanced Measures under S2

- Respirator fit test program
 - Hospital Infection Control Teams have revisited and offered the N95 respirator fit test program to all healthcare workers, in particular for those who work in high risk area.
- Pregnant staff
 - All pregnant staff should not be deployed into the high risk areas as stipulated in the Human Resources Circular (No.13/2013).
 http://ha.home/circular2/Hr-2013-13.pdf
- Blood donation arrangement
 - The HA Blood Transfusion Service (BTS) Expert Panel on Blood and Blood Products Safety has reviewed the blood donation arrangement. Members of public who have visited Wuhan should defer blood donation for 14 days from the date of departure.

Respiratory Protection Program for Healthcare Workers

- Before initial use of N95 respirator, fit test should be performed to select a suitable type, model and size of respirator for individual respirator user. Test results should be maintained according to local hospital protocol.
- Qualitative Fit Test (QLFT) and Quantitative Fit Test (QNFT)
- Maintain Fit Test results record







Repeat of N95 Respirator Fit Test

Under the following circumstances, retest of fit test should be done:

- A significant change on facial contour affecting the respirator fit
- A significant increase or decrease in weight (10%)
- Change in facial structure or scarring due to dental work, cosmetic surgery or accidents
- When no supply of appropriate model or size of respirator
- Any other condition that may interfere with face-piece sealing

Enhanced Measures under S2

Visiting hours

- Acute hospitals: not more than 2 hours per day and 2 visitors per visit
- Convalescent hospitals: not more than 4 hours per day and 2 visitors per visit

Volunteer service

- Should be suspended unless directives given by Cluster Chief Executive (CCE) and Hospital Infection Control Team based on risk assessment.
- Advice from CCC on 15 Jan, chaplaincy, non-statutory JP visits, education service provided by HK Red Cross, and Playright's Hospital Play Service should be suspended.
- Clinical attachment (including research activities)
 - Should be avoided in high risk areas. For other patient areas, directives on suspension will be given by CCC.

Staff Early Sickness Alert System (SESAS)



For early detection and control of potentially communicable infectious diseases / outbreaks

Staff Early Sickness Alert System (SESAS) 職員初期病徵預警系統

User Login(使用者登入)	
Logon Name(登入名稱) Password(密碼)	
Domain Name(網域名稱): CORP Login/登入	
☑ Save my "NT Domain" and "User Name" for next login 储存数约 認诚 和"使用老名祭"作下坑之用	
General enquiries (一般查詢): <u>Infection Control Team (防操小組)</u>	
Email to HAHO-HR Other Requests(其他申讀事項)	
fyou have anyquery please contact(IT Call Center) 2515-2653 OR input your query by d following link (Business Support Desk): 如有腦下有任何查詢·饒武禮 (IT Call Center) 2515-2653 或 按以下違趙(Business Suppor 人查納問題: Business Support Desk - http://wc.dciis02/bsd/hotline/Logon.asp	
News 最新済息 New HKID is replaced by Employee Number during sickness reporting. In the interest of personal data privacy, HKID is no longer required for reporting sickness for colleagues not on the list of "MyTeam". For non-HA staff and in case the Employee Number is not a wilable, the Employee Number field can be left blank and the system will generate a reference number for record purpose. 在較高速程中、「海道教育」、為 丁俊德在人會教派的、社会他人侵略自分解决而言。下不可答	

Risk Communication

- Internal:
 - Designated webpage
 - Communication kit
 - Staff forums
 - HASLink Express
 - HR Apps
 - HA Touch
- External:
 - Daily press release on no.
 of reported cases in the
 past 24 hours
 - Facebook



Stay Vigilant

 HA will continue to work with CHP in monitoring the latest situation and reinforce the preparedness and risk communications

Thank You